



Senate Intelligence Committee Makes Recommendations for Improving Domestic Intelligence

Talk of the Nation: December 12, 2002

NEAL CONAN, host:

This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington.

In Washington this week, an investigatory torch was passed. A congressional inquiry into intelligence failures before 9/11 issued its findings and recommendations and a new, independent investigation took its first steps into the next phase of the ongoing effort to find out what went wrong, why and how to fix it. Lessons learned and their application is our main focus this hour.

Later in the program, we'll explore the responsibilities of journalists in war crimes trials. Former Washington Post correspondent Jonathan Randal will join us to talk about his refusal to testify in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. But first, what we've learned about the failures in US intelligence before 9/11 and what might be done to make sure they don't happen again.

Our guest in this first segment of the program is Senator Bob Graham of Florida, the outgoing chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. If you have questions about what the CIA and the FBI did, right or wrong, and about the Intelligence Committee's proposed remedies, give us a call. Our phone number is (800) 989-8255. That's (800) 989-TALK. Our e-mail address is totn@npr.org.

And now Senator Graham joins us on the phone from his office in Miami.

And, welcome back to TALK OF THE NATION.

Senator BOB GRAHAM (Democrat, Florida): Thank you very much, and I want to extend my best wishes for the holiday season to you and all your colleagues and all your many listeners.

CONAN: Well, Senator, thanks, and the same to you. But if we could begin with your findings--and I should say that some of this material was not made public for reasons of national security--but on the basis of what we've seen, is it fair to say that various US intelligence agencies had possible leads and suspicions that might have allowed them to break up the hijack conspiracy?

Sen. GRAHAM: Yes, I would say that's a statement of fact, that there was information in a variety of places, which, if brought together before one set of analytical eyes, and if backing up those eyes was a curiosity to pursue leads, to gather further information, and a creativity to begin to see out of that information a pattern of an emerging plot, it would have been possible that the events of September the 11th could have been interdicted before they were instituted.

CONAN: Now a lot of this stuff has come out before, and a lot of people wonder, you know, why didn't they connect the dots, and one of the reasons you suggest is just a simple inability to believe that it could happen here.

Sen. GRAHAM: We had not had a terrorist attack inside the United States, other than those initiated by US persons, such as the one at Oklahoma City...

CONAN: Timothy McVeigh, yeah.

Sen. GRAHAM: ...in decades. You could go all the way back to the War of 1812 for an invasion of the continental United States. And so we had, as a nation and our intelligence agencies placed a very low probability, or possibility, on a domestic attack, and we were caught, maybe as we were at Pearl Harbor, by unnecessary surprise.

CONAN: The committee report does not spare institutions. It's openly critical of the CIA and the FBI and the NSA, but it does not criticize individuals, and as you know, your vice chairman, Senator Richard Shelby, felt very strongly that the directors of the CIA, the FBI and the NSA should be held accountable. Do you disagree?

Sen. GRAHAM: Our charter was to assess accountability as a process rather than to identify individuals. I don't believe it was within our reasonable capability, given the range of issues that we were expected to deal with, to also be making a detailed accounting of who was personally responsible. We have laid out a course of action which includes reference of all of the transcripts and materials that we've developed, to the inspectors general of the various

agencies involved, asking them to do that detailed assignment of responsibility in the context of the individual's role, both positively--there are certainly some people who need to be recognized and rewarded--and negatively--some people need to be sanctioned for their activities.

That report, in turn, will be submitted to the heads of the agencies, to the president of the United States who appointed those heads, and to Congress, so that there will be another round of review of personal accountability based on the work of the inspectors general.

CONAN: Again, our guest is Senator Bob Graham, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He's with us on the line from his office in Miami. Our telephone number is (800) 989-8255. That's (800) 989-TALK. The e-mail address, totn@npr.org.

And our first caller is Eric, who's on the line with us from San Francisco.

ERIC (Caller): Hi. Yesterday on "The NewsHour," Senator Shelby mentioned classified information regarding foreign government involvement in the 9/11 attacks, and I'm wondering if he was referring to the 120 Israeli spies arrested and deported since then, and I'm wondering why should the people not know this information?

Sen. GRAHAM: I can't comment as to your question because that is, itself, classified as to what foreign nation and what were the specifics of the involvement, but I completely agree with you and have been urging for the past several months that the FBI and the CIA lift their classification on much of this material. I personally believe that we're in a new era now, whereas our safety used to be felt to be secure by restricting what the public knew about national security issues. In this age of terror, our security will be advanced by more public knowledge and therefore more public involvement in being on the alert for these potential terrorist activities. Remember, it was a citizen who brought to our attention the basic facts that led us to the snipers who rained terror on the Washington, DC, area. As of today, the classifying agencies have been unwilling to lift the classification and make the information available to the American public. I hope that they will change that position and do it soon.

CONAN: Eric, thanks very much.

ERIC: Thank you.

CONAN: Senator, let's go over some of the recommendations of your panel, and begin with the proposal for a Cabinet-level director of national intelligence. How would that work?

Sen. GRAHAM: It would work much like, in 1947, the former individual military services were combined into a Department of Defense. We continued to have a civilian secretary of the Army and a military, uniformed head of the Army, but now they were part of a team which was under the direction of the secretary of Defense. We are suggesting a somewhat similar model now for the intelligence community. While theoretically there is a head of the intelligence community--it's called the director of Central Intelligence--that same person also is the operational head of one of entities within the intelligence community, the CIA. It would be like the Department of Defense secretary also being the head of the US Navy.

It is just inherently a conflict and a diversion, and the practical effect of it, as we have shown in a number of instances in our report, is that gaps have been created within the intelligence community where information is not fully shared, priorities are not set or if they are attempted to be set, they aren't followed. George Tenet declared war on al-Qaeda the end of 1998. Very few people heard the call to war, and those who did hear it, didn't do anything to respond to it. We believe that a much-strengthened national intelligence director who is at the level of a Cabinet agency will make a major contribution to eliminating many of the gaps and omissions which led to September the 11th.

CONAN: Let's go now to Carl, who's on the line with us from Charleston, South Carolina.

CARL (Caller): Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator, I just wanted to ask, do you think that an executive director of all of the intelligence agencies within the United States government would be a functional source for information to the president of the United States, along with interaction amongst the different communities of the intelligence agencies? And thank you very much for allowing me to pose this question. I'll take my response off the air.

CONAN: Thanks, Carl.

Sen. GRAHAM: Yeah. The answer is yes, in much the same way that the

president looks to the secretary of Defense as the primary source of information relative to the status, capabilities, needs of our military agencies. We are suggesting that the principal adviser to the president for intelligence should be the national intelligence executive.

CONAN: Let's go to Stephen, who joins us from San Diego.

STEPHEN (Caller): Neal, excellent topic.

Senator, thank you for your work.

Sen. GRAHAM: Thank you.

STEPHEN: Retired military here, San Diego, spent some time here, intelligence, cryptographic. This is well over--the bottlenecks--where--it looks like the agencies involved are very reluctant to do this. There's going to be bottlenecks. What can concerned citizens do to bring these proposals into reality?

Sen. GRAHAM: Well, if you define bottlenecks as being sources of resistance to change...

STEPHEN: Yes, sir.

Sen. GRAHAM: ...there certainly will be. Ours is not the first to recommend a director of national intelligence. In fact, almost every report--and there have been a dozen or more that have been submitted in the last decade--have had that recommendation. None of them, as of today, have been adopted. Why are we more optimistic? Unfortunately, we are more optimistic because of the enormous tragedy of September the 11th. People who want to defend the status quo now are going to have to face the reality that the status quo produced many of the weaknesses in our intelligence system which facilitated the hijackers being able to carry out their plot.

CONAN: Stephen, we're going to move on to get somebody else in, but thanks very much for your call.

STEPHEN: Thanks, Neal.

CONAN: OK. Bye-bye.

Let's go now to Sylvia. Sylvia's with us from Interior, South Dakota.

SYLVIA (Caller): Question--how does this investigation differ from what Henry Kissinger has been asked to do? Isn't this duplicating something that's already been done?

Sen. GRAHAM: It will differ from ours in several aspects. One, this is an unfolding story. Our committee knew a lot more about September the 11th on September of 2002 than we had known on January 1st of 2002. That pace of new information, providing additional leads and insights, will continue. One major reason for that is all those folks that are currently detained in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere who are being interrogated are providing, every week, some new insight into what happened before September the 11th. So they'll have the benefit of 18 months of additional information.

Second, our focus was on the role of the intelligence community in the events of September the 11th because that was our committee's jurisdiction and expertise, was the intelligence community. The commission headed by Dr. Kissinger and now former Congressman Lee Hamilton will be focused on all the other federal agencies as well as intelligence. We know that the immigration service, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of the Treasury, with its responsibilities for monitoring money flows, all had some piece of this tragedy of September the 11th, and the Kissinger-Hamilton commission will be the opportunity to go into those other areas.

CONAN: OK. Thanks very much, Sylvia.

SYLVIA: Yes.

CONAN: And Senator, we should correct--there was a foreign attack on the United States in 1993, the first bombing of the World Trade Center, but still, I think your point is well taken. We just have a minute left with you. I wanted to ask you about the concerns we've heard from many of our listeners about civil liberties. Tips, now total information awareness, a possible new civilian counterterrorism unit, which is one of the things you think about in your report--are we losing sight of the freedoms we seek to protect?

Sen. GRAHAM: In fact, we are very sensitive to that. In spite of the fact that we are so critical of the FBI and how well they have carried out their existing domestic intelligence function, we did not reach the conclusion that we should

change from the FBI, because we were aware of the civil liberties and privacy issues that were going to be raised, so we outlined a set of steps. The first step is, we're on a boat that has the potential of hitting an iceberg very soon.

CONAN: Senator Graham, I'm afraid we're going to have to leave that boat out at sea, but thank you very much for being with us today.

Sen. GRAHAM: OK. Thank you very much, and best wishes for the holiday.

CONAN: It's TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

(Soundbite of music)

CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington.

We're talking about recommendations to improve America's ability to thwart future terrorist attacks. Opinions vary on this. Should we focus on starting a new domestic intelligence agency, styled after Britain's MI5, or do we focus on fixing the agencies we already have? Do we need a Cabinet-level position of national intelligence director? If so, who should it be, and should anybody be held accountable for the failures in intelligence identified by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees?

We want to hear what you think. Our phone number is (800) 989-8255. That's (800) 989-TALK. You can send us e-mail: totn@npr.org.

Joining us now is Ronald Kessler, a journalist and the author of "The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI." He joins us on the phone from his office in Potomac, Maryland.

Good to have you on the program again.

Mr. RONALD KESSLER (Author, "The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI): Very good to be with you.

CONAN: And Mark Riebling is editorial director at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. He's the author of a new book, "Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security." He's with us from our bureau in New York City.

Welcome to TALK OF THE NATION.

Mr. MARK RIEBLING (Manhattan Institute for Policy Research): Good afternoon.

CONAN: And why don't we begin with the question that was posed by our e-mailer Rick in Fayetteville, North Carolina? 'Why do we need another position in the government to correct intelligence lapses?' The problem inside the Beltway is that no one is willing to place the good of the country over their own ambition or personal security in all levels of government, from the top down. A new position isn't going to correct a culture of "not me." And, well, why don't we begin with you, Ronald Kessler?

Mr. KESSLER: Well, I certainly agree that there's no reason to have an additional agency. The problem with this idea of a domestic spy agency is that it would be removed from the Justice Department and removed from a focus on violations of criminal laws, and that's what you really need, to make sure not only that people's rights are not violated as they were under J. Edgar Hoover, but also that the FBI remain focused on its mission, namely to catch terrorists, not to get into political beliefs and other extraneous areas, which is what happened under Hoover.

But as for the implication that it was all ego, first of all, you've got to keep in mind that it is very difficult to penetrate an organization like al-Qaeda and to stop a plot such as we saw, and it's not impossible. It's something that needs to be done. It's good that there's pressure from Congress to have perfection, but at the same time, it's not like snapping your finger. And when Senator Graham said, 'Well, if we connected the dots, we might have thwarted this,' he had about five qualifiers--if we put the dots together, if an analyst saw it all, if they initiated new investigations, if those investigations happened to produce something--so it's just, you know, not simple. It's not like mixing two chemicals and you suddenly come up with a solution.

At the same time, there's no question that the FBI was behind the ball, was not focused enough, was totally inundated with information that it didn't know what to do with. Its technology was abysmal because Louis Freeh, the director, didn't like technology--he didn't use e-mail himself--so there's lot of areas that need to be improved, and I think the answer right now is that these things are being improved, both at the CIA and the FBI. The cooperation really is pretty good at this point, and I think to just say, 'Well, we got to do something, we got to do something. Let's start another agency,' is not the right solution.

CONAN: Mark Riebling, what do you think about the proposal to create a new domestic intelligence agency to take over the counterterrorism roles of the FBI?

Mr. RIEBLING: I believe that it deserves serious study. I respect Mr. Kessler's work quite a bit. I disagree on this one point that we need to keep domestic intelligence under a criminal investigative outfit. I strongly disagree, in fact. I would much prefer the FBI to become like Scotland Yard--stick to the investigation of crimes, and have something like an American MI5, obviously under constitutional restraints and restrictions. And I certainly don't think that the FBI's being under the Justice Department prevented the violation of civil liberties. Indeed, Mr. Kessler mentions many of these, and if, you know, being in the Justice Department were any proper restraint in the FBI in that sense, I don't see why these things happened. So I don't see, in other words, to make a long story short, why an American MI5 can't operate under the FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and have a mandate which is broader than simply prosecuting terrorism as a crime, because I don't think terrorism is fundamentally a crime. It's an act of war.

CONAN: I wanted to ask you about the analogy that Senator Graham mentioned, and other people certainly have as well, and that is how the various armed services of the United States have been brought together since the Second World War, first in the Department of Defense, as he mentioned, and then later under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which created the current Joint Chiefs of Staff as we know it and the concept of jointness of all of these different services, which are still distinct, working more and more together. Obviously there are still a lot of rivalries between the various services, but they do serve together. The committee report proposes the same kind of jointness idea within the intelligence services. What do you think of that idea, and again, why don't we start this time with Mark Riebling?

Mr. RIEBLING: I think that's one of the ideas which I was most excited about when I read these recommendations. Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed in 1986, really did have a salutary effect on the consolidation of fighting jointly, and I think everyone who's taken a look at it sees that we're much better at this now. We don't have the same kinds of problems that we had in Grenada, where one service couldn't communicate with another. So how that's exactly effected in intelligence I think is somewhat problematic. I'm not sure the analogy is completely strict. What it will do is impose a kind of budgetary control and certainly a degree of this power is with the purse strings.

But I'm wary of anything which is too bureaucratic and too money-oriented in solutions. I really think what we need is a mind-set, and we need to make sure all the facts are centrally pooled. And my problem with the FBI and the CIA is that it's almost as if one is running IBM-based software and the other is running a Macintosh, and anyone who's ever tried to swap files knows that's a problem. And when you've got a law enforcement agency and an intelligence agency with different mandates, different missions, different cultures, different personalities, you're just asking for trouble every time there's a handoff, and in fact, if you look at history it's just amazing there haven't been more fumbles than there are.

CONAN: Just to point out that as recently as the Gulf War, the Air Force could not send e-mail to the Navy. But anyway, I wanted to get a response from you, Ronald Kessler.

Mr. KESSLER: Well, certainly Mark is right that the FBI and the CIA did not play well together in the past. But in recent years and especially since 9/11, there's been a tremendous change and they do work together. They worked together on the KGB. They worked in Afghanistan together. They worked on getting some of these terrorists rolled up. And the person who shot up the CIA was captured in Pakistan by a combination of CIA and FBI working together.

And this idea that the FBI is a bunch of cops and they don't really know how to do intelligence is just not right. If you look at, for example, some of the espionage cases that the FBI has done, those entail this development of informants, just as they developed informants in the Mafia. They used very sophisticated techniques to conduct surveillance of KGB officers. The problem was that those methods were not being used sufficiently in the terrorism area.

And there's also a very important connection between going after terrorists and going after a lot of other crimes because these terrorists engage in credit card fraud and all kinds of other criminal activities, you know, to make money. And, again, it's good for the FBI to be able to gather information about some of those other activities, which, in turn, leads to new leads in the terrorism area.

CONAN: Let's go now to Lawrence, who's on the line with us from Ann Arbor in Michigan.

LAWRENCE (Caller): I have two quick points. First of all, the 1947 act that

we're talking about already has appointed the same kind of czar; it's the national security adviser, it's explicit. He or she is charged with anti-terrorism. Secondly, as Eleanor Hill of the committee complained, the White House blocked who got what and when even though the documents had already been declassified. You put those two things together and I think neither committee is going to look in the right spot, which is the National Security Council and the national security adviser, who is expressly charged by statute with organizing our intelligence and providing for anti-terrorism.

CONAN: Mark Riebling, is that right?

Mr. RIEBLING: I think that's actually a very cogent point. I mean, intelligence and policy are interlinked. They're covalent. You can really not assess one without the other. And most Americans, because of the Church Committee hearings in the 1970s, believe that our intelligence agencies are more or less rogue elephants. But, in fact, they're very sensitive to policy-makers and to the priorities put on them by policy-makers. And certainly during the Clinton years, the nation as a whole and the pressure it was putting on its politicians and its policy-makers was not interested in foreign affairs, was not interested in hearing about terrorism. And so there's a system failure at work here which is larger than the intelligence community, which gets to people's distrust of government and their unwillingness to become engaged in these foreign conflicts. So I think the caller makes a very interesting point.

CONAN: OK. Thanks, Lawrence, very much.

LAWRENCE: You're welcome.

CONAN: OK. Here's an e-mail question we got from Bill in San Francisco. 'As to your question regarding "Should someone pay the price for intelligence failure?" I have the following thought: Admiral Kimmel and General Short got busted for the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. The captain of the Indianapolis got busted for the sinking of his ship. In both cases, more blame was due to the Pentagon than to the commanders in the field. Blame should not be placed so rapidly, as it becomes scapegoating.'

Ronald Kessler, would you concur?

Mr. KESSLER: Well, I'm not an expert on Pearl Harbor, but in this case, it's not a situation such as we had, for example, with Aldrich Ames, where he was a drunk, he didn't do his work, he couldn't be trusted, he would lose things.

Those are management flaws that should have been corrected by the people in charge at the CIA. And I think those people should have been disciplined when it turned out that Ames was a spy.

CONAN: And perhaps similarly the FBI with Mr. Hanssen.

Mr. KESSLER: Yes, that's right. There were definite, you know, problems with Hanssen that were not addressed by specific supervisors, and those people should have been disciplined. But when it comes to 9/11, you have an overall system that just was not geared up properly to deal with this problem.

At the CIA, you did have reports of terrorists coming into the CIA who turned out to be entering the US, but there was--and you could say, 'Well, the person who read that cable should have done something and should have been disciplined because that person didn't do something.' But the truth is that there was no system, there was no policy to actually do something. I mean, you know, you talk to the INS or the State Department and it would just get lost. The INS is still an incredibly--if it's still around--flawed agency. And so I just don't think it's fair to single out people for discipline in the 9/11 situation.

CONAN: Ronald Kessler?

Mr. KESSLER: Mark, you mean?

CONAN: Excuse me. I apologize. Mark Riebling, yes.

Mr. RIEBLING: I certainly agree that it's wrong to scapegoat individuals when we're talking about system failures. I do have a question for Mr. Kessler, if I might.

CONAN: Yeah?

Mr. RIEBLING: You mentioned that the FBI should apply against terrorists some of the same methods that's used against the Mafia, to great success, particularly since the 1980s; and I very much agree. But you quoted a remark by Mr. Martin in your recent book on the bureau which seemed to me to be saying double agents are basically worthless in counterespionage cases. We want to arrest these guys, we don't want to run them as double agents and penetrate these organizations. But don't we, in fact, want to penetrate al-Qaeda using double agents and, to the extent we can, to turn some of these guys, as the Israelis have managed to do, against the terrorists?

Mr. KESSLER: Absolutely. But the context that John Martin was talking about when he mentioned double agents, I believe, was when someone has been apprehended as a traitor. For example, a John Walker, who was giving naval codes to the Russians. And then the CIA would say, 'Oh, let's make him a double agent,' you know, 'let's see what he can find out from the other side.' And John Martin, who formerly headed the Justice Department counterespionage section, would say, 'That's crazy. We have to have a deterrent. We can't just let traitors get off free.' That's what he was talking about. So there's no question that, yes, we need double agents to penetrate these organizations.

CONAN: You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

And now let's go to Mark, who's on the line with us from Vancouver, Washington.

MARK (Caller): Yes, I'd like to cite a parallel problem the fire service and police had domestically several years ago in which we had multiple jurisdictional problems with large incidents, you know, expanding beyond a local city into a county, fire service to police service. And they instituted an incident command system. And after training on this for several years, we found that it actually works very well and we have good operational command and good cooperation radio frequencies, that sort of thing. And it's actually worked very well. I was wondering about the possibility of use for this similar kind of system in intelligence.

CONAN: Mark Riebling, is there an analogy there?

Mr. RIEBLING: I'm not sure that there is. I do work with local police in certain extents trying to get them to share information between jurisdictions. That's very important in the Northeast Corridor here in the United States. And Mr. Kessler makes a good point that some of these guys may be terror suspects engaged in criminal activity of a nature which would have led us to get on to them at an earlier stage. For instance, some of these guys had traffic tickets before 9/11, and if they weren't on watch lists, some of them could have been or should have been. So you can get these little trip wires set up. But one jurisdiction has to know what's going on in another jurisdiction. That's very important.

I don't think technology is always the answer. A lot of it is just good cop-to-

cop relationships or, you know, spy-to-spy liaison relationships, obviously, from county to county, from nation to nation. Those things are really important. But you have to build up trust. And, you know, one of the things that happened before 9/11 between FBI and CIA is after the Aldrich Ames case, and certainly right after the Hanssen case, the trust between these two agencies was not high because each sort of suspected the other of harboring a mole. And you're going to be a little bit hesitant to share sensitive intelligence when you feel like your partner may be corrupted or may be sieve-like in a certain way.

CONAN: Mark, thanks very much.

MARK: Thank you.

Mr. RIEBLING: You're welcome.

CONAN: And--well, that was Mark the caller. Mark Riebling, we're going to say goodbye to you in a couple of minutes. But I wanted to ask both you and Ronald Kessler a question about money. At the moment, US intelligence absorbs something on the order of about \$30 billion a year. How much more is it going to take to help resolve these problems? Do we need new layers of bureaucracy?

And, Ronald Kessler, why don't you go first.

Mr. KESSLER: I think the idea of a Cabinet post is good because it would be someone who could actually have control of the total intelligence budget. Eighty percent of the total intelligence budget now is spent by the Defense Department and controlled by the Defense Department, even though the director of Central Intelligence supposedly coordinates those activities. When you actually get down to how much is spent by the FBI and the CIA, it really isn't that much. The FBI is about \$4 billion a year. That's about two B-2 bombers. Eleven thousand, five hundred agents; that compares with 40,000 New York City police officers, and yet we expect the FBI not only to protect us from terrorists but to go after the Enron and Worldcom people of this world, to catch kidnapers, to get the Mafia, to go after political corruption, not to mention espionage.

And instead of simply moving agents off into counterterrorism, as is being done now and they're now ...(unintelligible) agent...

CONAN: And very quickly, please.

Mr. KESSLER: ...I think we should simply double the size of the FBI.

CONAN: Mark Riebling, the last 30 seconds are yours.

Mr. RIEBLING: Well, what Mr. Kessler said about the FBI having all these missions goes very much to my point of why, but whoever is tracking terrorists in the United States should have one mission. That should be what they do. That should be what their money is for. That should be what they're trained for. And that's how we should be organized. I don't think money's the problem. I think we're improperly focused or uncoordinated. We need to get our act together before, as Senator Graham warned, we strike another iceberg.

CONAN: Mark Riebling's book is "Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security."

Thanks very much.

Mr. RIEBLING: Thank you.

CONAN: And Ronald Kessler is the author of "The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI."

Thanks to you.

Mr. KESSLER: My pleasure.

CONAN: When we return, we'll shift focus and speak with a journalist who did not want to testify against war crimes.

It's TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.